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Abstract In this contribution we consider a seasonal consumer-resource system and
focus on the evolution of consumer behavior. It is assumed that consumer and re-
source individuals live and interact during seasons of fixed lengths separated by
winter periods. All individuals die at the end of the season and the size of the next
generation is determined by the the consumer-resource interaction which took place
during the season. Resource individuals are assumed to reproduce at a constant rate,
while consumers have to trade-off between foraging for resources, which increases
their reproductive abilities, or reproducing. Firstly, we assume that consumers coop-
erate in such a way that they maximize each consumer individual fitness. Secondly,
we consider the case where such a population is challenged by selfish mutants who
do not cooperate. Finally we study the system dynamics over many seasons and
show that mutants eventually replace the original cooperating population, but are
finally as vulnerable as the initial cooperating consumers.
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1 Introduction
Among the many ecosystems found on Earth, one can easily identify many examples
of resource-consumer systems like e.g. plant-grazer, prey-predator or host-parasitoid
systems known in biology [12]. Usually, individuals involved in such systems (bac-
teria, plants, insects, animals, etc.) have conflicting interests and models describing
such interactions are based on principles of game theory [14, 8, 2, 7]. Hence, the
investigation of such models is of interest to both game theoreticians and behavioral
and evolutionary biologists.
One of the main topics of evolutionary theory is addressing whether individu-
als should behave rationally throughout their lifetime. Darwin’s statement of the
survival of the fittest indicates that evolution selects the best reproducers, so that
the evolutionary process should result in selecting organisms which appear to be-
have rationally, even though they may know little about rationality. Evolutionary
processes may thus result in organisms which actually maximize their number of
descendants [17]; this is true in systems in which density dependence can be ne-
glected, or in which the relation between the organisms and their environment is
fairly simple [13]. Otherwise, such a rule may not apply and evolution is expected
to yield a population which employs an evolutionarily stable strategy; such a strat-
egy will not allow them to get the maximum possible number of descendants, but
cannot be beaten by any strategy a deviant organism may choose to follow [10, 19].
In the following, since we will be concerned with populations in which some or-
ganisms may deviate from the others, we will use the terminology from Adaptive
Dynamics [6] and designate by ‘mutants’ the organisms adopting a strategy differ-
ent from the one of the main population, which will be referred to as the resident
population.
In this work we study the fate of mutants based on an example of a seasonal
consumer-resource system with optimal consumers as introduced by [1] using a
semi-discrete approach [9]. In such a system, consumer and resource individuals
are active during seasons of fixed length T separated by winter periods. To give
an idea of what such a system could represent, the resource population could be
annual plants and the consumer population some univoltine phytophagous insect
species. All consumers and resources die at the end of the season and the size of
the next generation is determined by the number of offspring produced during the
previous season (i.e. offspring are made of seeds or eggs which mature into active
stages at the beginning of the season). We assume that consumers have to share their
time between foraging for resources, which increases their reproductive abilities, or
reproducing. The reproduction of the resource population is assumed to occur at a
constant rate.
In nature several patterns of life-history can be singled out, but they frequently
contain two main phases: growth phase and reproduction phase. The transition be-
tween these two phases can be strict when the consumers only feed at the beginning
of their life and only reproduce at the end, or there could exist an intermediate
phase between them where growth and reproduction occur simultaneously. Such
types of behaviors are called determinate and indeterminate growth patterns re-
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spectively [15]. Time-sharing between laying eggs and feeding for the consumers
will be modeled by the variable u: u = 1 means feeding, u = 0 on the other hand
means reproducing. Intermediate values u ∈ (0,1) describe a situation where, for
some part of the time, the individual is feeding and, for the other part of the time, it
is reproducing.
Firstly, we consider a population of consumers maximizing their common fit-
ness, all consumers being individuals having the same goal function and acting for
the common good; these will be the residents. We then suppose that a small fraction
of the consumer population starts to behave differently from the main population,
and accordingly will call them mutants. The aim of this paper is to investigate how
mutants will behave in the environment shaped by the residents, and what conse-
quences can be expected for multi-season consumer-resource systems.
2 Main model
2.1 Previous work
Let us first consider a system of two populations: resources and consumers without
any mutant. The consumer population is modeled with two state variables: the aver-
age energy of one individual p and the number of consumers c present in the system,
while the resource population is described solely by its density n. We suppose that
both populations are structured in mature (adult insects/plants) and immature stages
(eggs/seeds). During the season, mature consumers and resources interact and repro-
duce themselves. Between seasons (during winter periods) all mature individuals die
and individuals become mature in the next season.
We suppose that no consumers have any energy (p = 0) at the beginning of the
season. The efficiency of reproduction is assumed to be proportional to the value of
p; it is thus intuitive that consumers should feed on the resource at the beginning
and reproduce at the end once they have gathered enough energy. The consumers
thus face a trade-off between investing their time in feeding (u = 1) or laying eggs
(u = 0). According to [1], the within season dynamics are given by
p˙ =−κ p+ηnu, n˙ =−δcnu, (1)
where we assume that neither population suffers from intrinsic mortality; κ , η and
δ are constants. After rescaling the time and state variables, the constants κ and η
can be eliminated and the system of equations (1) can be rewritten in the simpler
form:
p˙ =−p+nu, n˙ =−cnu, (2)
where c is a rescaled parameter which is proportional to the number of consumers
present in the system.
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Fig. 1 Optimal collective behavior of the residents illustrated in the (τ,x) plane (see eq. (4)) where
τ is reverse time. On the figure, solutions are then initiated at (T, p(0)/n(0)) where T is the length
of the season.
The amount of immature offspring produced during the season depends on the
sizes of the populations
J =
∫ T
0
θc(1−u(t))p(t)dt, Jn =
∫ T
0
γn(t)dt, (3)
where θ and γ are constants.
We assume that consumers maximize the value J, their number of descendants,
which is a classical measure of fitness. We see that this is an optimal control problem
which can be solved using dynamic programming [3] or the Pontryagin maximum
principle [16]. To compute the solution of this problem, the constants c, θ and γ can
be omitted from (3), without loss of generality.
All the equations describing the problem are homogeneous of degree one in the
state variables, which can be only positive. This is a particular case of Noether’s
theorem in the calculus of variations about problems which are invariant under a
group of transformations [4]. Hence, the dimension of the phase space of the optimal
control problem (2-3) can be lowered by one unit by the introduction of a new
variable x = p/n. In this case its dynamics can be written in the form:
x˙ =−x(1− cu)+u, (4)
and the Bellman function U˜(p,n, t) =
∫ T
T−t(1− u(s))p(s)ds with the starting point
at (p(t),n(t)) = (p,n) can be expressed as U˜(p,n, t) = nU(x, t).
The solution of the optimal control problem (2-3) has been obtained in [1] and
the optimal behavioral pattern for c = 1.5 and T = 2 is shown on Fig. 1. These
solutions are not restricted to the case where consumers have no energy at the initial
time. The region with u = 1 is separated from the region with u = 0 by a switching
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curve S and a singular arc Sσ such that
S: x = 1− e−τ (5)
Sσ : τ =− logx+
2
xc
−
4
c
, (6)
where τ = T − t. They are shown on Fig. 1 by thick curves. Along the singular arc
Sσ the consumer uses intermediate control u = uˆ:
uˆ =
2x
2+ xc
. (7)
When P(0) = 0, one might identify a bang-bang control pattern for short seasons
T ≤ T1 and a bang-singular-bang pattern for long seasons T > T1. The value T1 is
computed as
T1 =
log(c+1)+(c−2) log2
c−1
, (8)
so that it depends on the number of consumers present in the system.
The optimal value of the amount of offspring produced by an individual can be
computed using this solution. In the following, we focus on the behavior of mutants
appearing in a population of consumers adopting the type of behavior given in Fig. 1.
2.2 Consumer-mutant-resource system
Suppose that there is a subpopulation of consumers that deviate from the residents’
behavior. Let us assume that these are selfish and maximize their own fitness, and
not the fitness of the whole population, taking into account that the main resident
population acts as if the mutants were kin (i.e. residents do not understand that
mutants are selfish). This means that the residents adjust their strategy by changing
the control whenever its level is intermediate. Such adjustment is possible only when
some certain conditions are satisfied and mutant subpopulation is small enough (see
section 3.2)
Denote the proportion of mutants in the whole population of consumers by ε and
the variables describing the state of the mutant and resident populations by symbols
with subscripts “m” and “r” respectively. Then the number of mutants and residents
will be cm = εc and cr = (1− ε)c and the dynamics of the system can written as
p˙r =−pr +nur, p˙m =−pm +num, n˙ =−nc [(1− ε)ur + εum] , (9)
similarly to (2). The variable um ∈ [0,1] defines the decision pattern of the mutants.
The control ur ∈ [0,1] is the decision pattern of the residents and defined by the
solution of the optimal control problem (2-3).
The number of offspring in the next season is defined similarly to (3):
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Jr =
∫ T
0
θ(1−ur(t))cr pr(t)dt, Jm =
∫ T
0
θ(1−um(t))cm pm(t)dt, Jn =
∫ T
0
γn(t)dt,
(10)
where the mutant chooses its control um striving to maximize its fitness Jm.
We can see that the problem under consideration is described in terms of a two-
step optimal control problem (or a hierarchical differential game): in the first step
we define the optimal behavior of the residents (see section 2.1), in the second step
we identify the optimal response of the mutants to this strategy.
3 Optimal free-riding
Since θ and γ are constants, they can be omitted from the description of the op-
timization problem Jm → max
um
. In this case the functional Jm/(θcm) can be taken
instead of the functional Jm.
Let one introduce the Bellman function U˜m for the mutant population. It satisfies
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
∂U˜m
∂ t
+max
um
[
∂U˜m
∂ pr
(−pr +nur)+
∂U˜m
∂ pm
(−pm +num)−
∂U˜m
∂n
nc((1− ε)ur + εum)+ pm(1−um)
]
= 0. (11)
Introducing new variables xr = pr/n and xm = pm/n and using a transformation
of the Bellman function of the form U˜m(pr, pm,n, t) = nUm(xr,xm, t), we can reduce
the dimension of the problem by one using Noether’s theorem. The modified HJB-
equation (11) takes the following form
H
.
=−ν +max
um
{
λr [−xr(1− c((1− ε)ur + εum))+ur]+
λm [−xm(1− c((1− ε)ur + εum))+um]−
Umc((1− ε)ur + εum)+ xm(1−um)
}
= 0, (12)
where the components of the gradient of the Bellman function are denoted by
∂Um/∂xr = λr, ∂Um/∂xm = λm and ∂Um/∂τ = ν , variable τ denotes backward
time, τ = T − t. The optimal control can be defined be um = Heav(Am), where
Am = ∂H /∂um = λrxrεc+λm(1+ xmεc)−Umεc− xm and Heav(·) is a unit step
function whose value is zero for negative argument and one for positive argument.
One of the efficient ways to solve the HJB-equation is to use the method of
characteristics (see e.g. [11]). The system of characteristics for equation (12) is
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x′r = xr(1− c((1− ε)ur + εum))−ur, x
′
m = xm(1− c((1− ε)ur + εum))−um,
λ ′r =−λr, λ
′
m =−λm +1−um, U
′
m =−Umc((1− ε)ur + εum)+ xm(1−um),
(13)
where the prime denotes differentiation with respect to backward time τ . The ter-
minal condition Um(xr,xm,T ) = 0 gives λr(T ) = λm(T ) = 0. Thus Am(T ) < 0 and
um(T ) = 0 (mutants should reproduce at the very end of their life).
3.1 First steps
If we emit the characteristic field from the terminal surface t = T with ur = um = 0,
then
x′r = xr, x
′
m = xm, λ
′
r =−λr, λ
′
m =−λm +1, U
′
m = xm ,
λr(T ) = λm(T ) = 0, Um(T ) = 0 .
We get the following equations for state and conjugate variables and for the Bellman
function: xr = xr(T )e
τ , xm = xm(T )e
τ , λr = 0, λm = 1− e
−τ , Um = xm(1− e
−τ).
From this solution we can see that there could exist a switching surface Sm:
Sm: xm = 1− e
−(T−t), (14)
such that Am = 0 on it and where the mutant changes its control. Equation (14)
is similar to (5). However, we should take into account the fact that there is also
a hypersurface Sr, where the resident changes its control from ur = 0 to ur = 1
independently of the decision of the mutant. Hence it is important to define which
surface, Sr or Sm the characteristic intersects first, see Fig. 2. Suppose that this is the
surface Sr. Since the control ur changes its value on Sr, the HJB-equation (12) also
changes and, as a consequence, the conjugate variables ν , λr and λm could possibly
be discontinuous. Let us denote the incoming characteristic field (in backward time)
by “−” and the outcoming field by “+”. Consider a point of intersection of the
characteristic and the surface Sr with coordinates (xr1 ,xm1 ,τ1). Thus xr1 = 1− e
−τ1
and the normal vector ϑ to the switching surface is written in the form
ϑ = ∇Sr = (∂Sr/∂xr,∂Sr/∂xm,∂Sr/∂τ)
T = (−1,0,1− xr1)
T .
From the incoming field we have the following information about the co-state λ−r =
0, λ−m = xr1 , ν
− = xm1(1− xr1). Since the Bellman function is continuous on the
surface Sr, we have: U
+
m =U
−
m =Um = xm1xr1 . The gradient ∇Um has a jump in the
direction of the normal vector ϑ : ∇U+m = ∇U
−
m + kϑ . Here k is an unknown scalar.
Thus
λ+r =−k, λ
+
m = xr1 , ν
+ = xm1(1− xr1)+ k(1− xr1) (15)
If we suppose that the control of the mutant is the same, u+m = 0 (in this case A
+
m
should be negative), the HJB-equation (12) has the form
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Fig. 2 Some family of optimal trajectories emanating from the terminal surface
−ν++λ+[−xr1(1− (1− ε)c)+1]−λ
+
m xm1(1− (1− ε)c)− (1− ε)cUm + xm1 = 0.
(16)
Substituting the values from (15) into (16) we get: k[−2(1−xr1)−xr1(1−ε)c] = 0,
which leads to k = 0 and, actually, there is no jump in the conjugate variables. They
keep the same values as in (15) and A +m = A
−
m .
Conversely, the mutant may react to the decision of the resident and also change
its control on Sr from u
−
m = 0 to u
+
m = 1. This is fulfilled if A
+
m > 0. Substitution
of the values ν+, λ+r and λ
+
m from (15) to the HJB-equation (12) gives k = (xr1 −
xm1)/(xr1c+(1− xr1)) and
A
+
m = λ
+
r xr1εc+λ
+
m (xm1εc+1)−εcUm−xm1 =(xr1−xm1)
(1− ε)xr1c+(1− xr1)
xr1c+(1− xr1)
,
which is positive when xr1 > xm1 . In Fig. 2 this corresponds to the points of the
surface Sr which are below the line l1: xr = xm = 1−e
−τ . For the optimal trajectories
which go through such points: ur(τ1+0) = um(τ1+0) = 1. One can show that there
will be no more switches of the control. However, if we consider a trajectory going
from a point above l1, then ur(τ1+δ ) = 1 and um(τ1+δ ) = 0 with arbitrarily small
δ > 0; a switch of the control um from zero to one then takes place later (in backward
time). After that, there will be no more switches.
Now consider a trajectory emitted from the terminal surface which first inter-
sects the surface Sm rather than the surface Sr. In this case the situation depicted in
Fig. 3 takes place: one might expect the appearance of a singular arc Sσ1 there. The
following are necessary conditions for its existence
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H = 0= H0+Amum, H0 =−ν −λxr −λmxm + xm (17)
Am = 0= λrxrεc+λm(xmεc+1)− εcUm− xm (18)
A
′
m = {Am H0}= 0
.
= Am1, (19)
where the curly brackets denote the Poisson (Jacobi) brackets. If ξ is a vector of
state variables and ψ is a vector of conjugate ones (in our case ξ = (xr,xm,τ) and
ψ = (λr,λm,ν)), then the Poisson brackets of two functions F = F(ξ ,ψ,Um) and
G = G(ξ ,ψ,Um) are given by the formula: {F G}= 〈Fξ +ψ FUm , Gψ〉−〈Fψ , Gξ +
ψ GUm〉. Here 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product and e.g. Fψ = ∂F/∂ψ .
After some algebra, (19) takes the form
Am1 = νεc+ xm +λrxrεc− (xm +1)(1−λr) = 0 (20)
We can derive the variable ν from (17) and substitute it into (20). We get Am1 =
xm−1+λm = 0. This leads to λm = 1− xm and
λr =
xm + εUm +(1− xm)(xmεc+1)
xrεc
,
which is obtained from (18).
To derive the singular control um = u˜m ∈ (0,1) along the singular arc, one
should write the second derivative: A ′′m = 0 = {{AmH }H } = {{AmH0}H0}+
{{AmH0}Am}u˜m. Thus
u˜m =
{{AmH0}H0}
{Am{AmH0}}
=
2xm
2+ xmεc
, (21)
which has the same form as (7).
The equation for the singular arc Sσ1 can be obtained from the system of dynamic
equations (13) by substituting ur = 0 and um = u˜m from (21):
x′m =−
x2mεc
2+ xmεc
, xm(τ = log2) = 1/2 .
Finally, we have the analogous expression to (6):
Sσ1 : T − t =− logxm +
2
xmεc
−
4
εc
(22)
for ε 6= 0. If ε = 0, the surface Sm is a hyperplane xm = 1/2.
After these steps we have the structure of the solution shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3 Construction of the singular arc Sσ1
3.2 Optimal motion along the surface Sσr
According to the computations done in section 2.1, resident consumers must adopt
a behavior ur which keeps the surface S
σ
r invariant (see Fig. 3). In a mutant-free
population, this is done by playing the singular control (7), but if mutants are present
in the population, the dynamics of the system are modified and the mutant-free
singular control (7) does not make Sσr invariant any more. However, residents may
still make Sσr invariant by adopting a different behavior, denoted uˆr, as long as the
mutants’ influence, i.e. ε , is not too large. To compute uˆr, we notice that it should
make xr follow the dynamics depicted in Fig. 1, i.e. x˙r = −xr(1− cur)+ ur with
ur = uˆ defined in equation (7). We get that uˆr should be computed from:
x′r =−
x2r c
2+ xrc
= xr(1− c((1− ε)uˆr + εum))− uˆr ,
so that
uˆr =
2xr(1+ xrc)
(1+(1− ε)xrc)(2+ xrc)
−
xrεcum
1+(1− ε)xrc
. (23)
Thus, the residents will be able to keep Sσr invariant provided uˆr ∈ [0,1] for all points
belonging to Sσr and for all possible values of um ∈ [0,1].
To identify for which parameters of the model this is possible, we may notice
that uˆr is a linear function of um and decreasing. Moreover,
ur(um = 0) =
2xr(1+ xrc)
(1+(1− ε)xrc)(2+ xrc)
≤ 2xr
1+ xrc
2+ xrc
≤ 1 ,
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since xr ≤ 1/2. Conversely, when um = 1, ur =
2xr
2+xrc
1+xrc−εc−εcxrc/2
1+(1−ε)xrc
. If this value
is larger than 0 for any xr belonging to S
σ
r , invariance of S
σ
r is ensured. A condition
for this to occur is
ε < 1/c. (24)
It is interesting to notice that ur(um = 0) is larger than the original uˆ in (7), since the
residents must compensate for the non-eating mutants. Conversely, when um = 1,
ur < uˆ. The tipping point takes place when um = uˆ, which ensures ur = um; mutants
behaving like the original residents allow the residents to behave as such.
In this paper we consider only the values of ε satisfying (24), i.e. such that the
residents are able to adopt their optimal behavior, in spite of the presence of mu-
tants. Otherwise, the influence of the mutants on the system may be too large, and
the residents would not have the possibility to stick to their fitness maximization
program.
The control uˆr = uˆr(xr,xm,τ,um) is defined in feedback form, i.e. it depends on
the time and on the state of the system. The corresponding Hamiltonian (12) needs
to be modified to
Hˆ = H (xr,xm,Um,λr,λm,ν , uˆr(xr,xm,τ,um),um), (25)
so that the coefficient multiplying the control um becomes
ˆAm =
∂Hˆ
∂um
=
λm(1+ xr(1− ε)c+ xmεc)− εcUm
1+(1− ε)xrc
− xm . (26)
This expression allows us to compute the optimal behavior of the mutants on the
surface Sσr , but the calculations are quite complicated. To make things simpler, let
us first consider the particular case of vanishingly small values of ε and study the
optimal behavioral pattern.
3.3 Particular case of a vanishingly small population of mutants
3.3.1 On the singular surface Sσr
If ε ∼= 0, the mutants’ influence on the system is negligible and, to make Sσr invariant,
the resident should apply the mutant-free singular behavior computed in (7): uˆr =
2xr/(2+ xrc). In addition, equations (25) and (26) take the following form
Hˆ =−ν +
λrx
2
r c
2+ xrc
+λm
(
−xm
2− xrc
2+ xrc
+um
)
−Um
2xrc
2+ xrc
+ xm(1−um) (27)
ˆAm = λm− xm . (28)
12 A.R. Akhmetzhanov, F. Grognard, L. Mailleret and P. Bernhard
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
τ
0.5
1
x
r
0.5
1
x
m
S
r
S
1
σ
S  
(x
r2
, x
m2
, τ
2
)  
S
m
S 
r
 σ
S σ 
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If the trajectory originates (in backward time) from some point belonging to Sσr
such that xσm
.
= xm(τ = log2)> 1/2, then um(τ = log2) = 0 and the system of char-
acteristics for the Hamiltonian (27) is
x′r =−
x2r c
2+ xrc
, x′m = xm
2− xrc
2+ xrc
, λ ′m =−λm +1 , U
′
m =−Um
2xrc
2+ xrc
+ xm (29)
with boundary conditions: τ = log2, xr = 1/2, xm = x
σ
m, λm = 1/2,Um = x
2
m/2. Thus
λm = 1−e
−τ and there exists a switching curve Sˆ, which is defined as: xm = 1−e
−τ
in addition to τ =− logxr +2/(xrc)−4/c. Thus Sˆ = Sm∩S
σ
r .
The switching curve Sˆ ends at the point with coordinates (xr2 ,xm2 ,τ2) where
the characteristics become tangent to it and the singular arc Sˆσ appears (see Fig.
4). Before determining the coordinates of this point, let us define the singular arc,
denoted Sˆσ . From (27-28) we get
ν =
λrx
2
r c
2+ xrc
−λmxm
2− xrc
2+ xrc
−Um
2xrc
2+ xrc
+ xm, λm = xm (30)
along the singular arc. Substitution of (30) into equation ˆA ′m = 0 gives xm = (2+
xrc)/4.
In addition, the intermediate control uˆm can be derived from ˆA
′′
m = 0 and is equal
to
uˆm =
1
2+ xrc
,
which is positive and belongs to the interval between zero and one.
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We see that the coordinates xr2 , xm2 and τ2 can be defined by the following equa-
tions
xm2 =
2+ xr2c
4
= 1− e−τ2 , τ2 =− logxr2 +
2
xr2c
−
4
c
,
which comes from the fact that the point (xr2 ,xm2 ,τ2) belongs to Sˆ
σ and is located
on the intersection of the curves Sˆσ and Sˆ. This result is illustrated in Fig. 4.
3.3.2 Outside the singular surface Sσr
If the state is outside the surface Sσr , things are a little easier since at least the behav-
ior of the residents, ur, is constant and equal to 0 or 1, depending on the respective
value of τ and xr.
We can actually show that the surface Sσ1 (where ur = 0) can be extended further
by considering the situation in Fig. 3. Indeed, the following conditions are fulfilled
for this region:
H
∣∣∣
ur=0
=−ν −λrxr −λmxm + xm = 0, Am = λm− xm = 0, A
′
m = 0 .
Therefore, ν =−λrxr−λmxm+xm, λm = xm and the condition A
′
m = 0:−1+2xm =
0 gives xm = 1/2, which is precisely the definition of S
σ
1 when ε = 0 (see equation
(22)).
Consider now the region where xr is smaller than on the surface S
σ
r (see Fig. 4),
where ur = 1. There is a switching surface which extends the surface Sm and is
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defined by the same equation (14). However, there could also exist a singular arc Sσ2
starting from some points of Sm. Such an arc must satisfy the following conditions
H
∣∣∣
ur=1
=−ν −λr(xr(1− c)−1)−λmxm(1− c)− zUm + xm = 0 (31)
Am = λm− xm = 0, A
′
m = 0, (32)
which give a possible candidate for a singular arc Sσ2 : xm = 1/(2− c). We see that
its appearance is possible only for c < 1, since xm must belong to Sm. For c > 1
the structure of the solution in the domain below the surface Sσr is actually simpler
and consists only of the switching surface Sm, see Fig. 5. Notice that in the case
xr(0) = xm(0) = 0 investigated below, the existence of the singular arc S
σ
2 is not
relevant, since it cannot be reached from such initial conditions.
3.4 Computation of the value functions in the case ε = 0
Following [1], we assume that at the beginning of the season the energy of con-
sumers is zero: xr(0) = xm(0) = 0. Therefore, we should take into account only the
trajectories coming from these zero initial conditions. The phase space is reduced
in this case to the one shown in Fig. 6. One can see that there are three different
regions depending on the length of the season T . If it is short enough, i.e. T ≤ T1
(see equation (8)), then the behavior of the mutant coincides with the behavior of
the resident and the main population cannot be invaded: actually, the behavior of
the mutant coincides with the behavior of the residents. If the length of the season
is between T1 and T2, there is a period in the life-time of a resident when it applies
an intermediate strategy and spares some amount of the resource for its future use.
Mutants are able to use this fact and there exists a strategy that guarantees them
better results.
Let us introduce the analogue of the value function U˜m for the resident and denote
it by U˜r:
U˜r(pr, pm,n, t) =
∫ T
T−t
pr(s)(1−ur(s))ds .
The value U˜r(0,0,n(0),T ) represents the amount of eggs laid by the resident dur-
ing a season of length T . Its value depends on the state of the system and the fol-
lowing transformation can be done U˜r(pr, pm,n, t) = nUr(xr,xm, t). In the follow-
ing, we omit some parameters and write the value function in the simplified form
Ur(T )
.
=Ur(0,0,T ) where the initial conditions xr(0) = xm(0) = 0 have been taken
into account.
In the region A (see Fig. 6) the value functions for both populations (of mutants
and residents) are equal to each otherUm(T ) =Ur(T ) = x1e
−c(T−τ1). Here the value
τ1 can be defined from the intersection of the trajectory and the switching curve
Sr ∩Sm:
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1− e−τ1 =
e(c−1)(T−τ1)−1
c−1
.
To obtain the value functions in the regions B and C, one must solve the system
of characteristics (29) in the case when the characteristics move along the surface Sσr
and um = 1. This leads to the following characteristic equations for the Hamiltonian
(27):
x′r =−
x2r c
2+ xrc
, x′m = xm
2− xrc
2+ xrc
−1, U ′m =−Um
x2r c
2+ xrc
,
and consequently
xm =C1x
2
r e
τ + xrz+1, Um =C2x
2
r , C1,C2 = const , (33)
where C1 and C2 are defined from the boundary conditions, while equation (6) is
also fulfilled.
Along the singular arc Sˆσ the mutant uses the intermediate strategy (21). In this
case,
U ′m =−Umcuˆr + xm(1− u˜m) =−Um
2xrc
2+ xrc
+
1+ xrc
4
.
Since x′r =−
x2r c
2+xrc
, we have dUm
dxr
= 2Um
xr
− (1+xrc)(2+xrc)
4x2r c
. Thus
Um =C3x
2
r +
4+3xrc(3+2xrc)
24xrc
, C3 = const . (34)
We now undertake to compute the limiting season length T2 that separates the
region B from the region C. The coordinates of the point B were obtained in the
previous section. To define the coordinates of the point (xσr2 ,x
σ
m2
,τσ2 ) of intersection
of the optimal trajectory with the curve AD, we use the dynamics of motion along the
surface Sσr with ur = uˆr and um = 1 (33): xm =C1x
2
r e
τ +xrz+1, where the constant
C1 should be chosen such that: xm2 =C1x
2
r2
eτ2 + xr2c+1, xm2 =
2+xr2 c
4
= 1− e−τ2 .
Therefore C1 =
(xr2 c−2)(3xr2 c+2)
16x2r2
. After that the coordinates: xσr2 , x
σ
m2
and τσ2 can be
defined from the following conditions
xσm2 = x
σ
2 =C1(x
σ
r2
)2eτ
σ
2 + xσr2c+1, τ
σ
2 =− logx
σ
r2
+
2
xσr2c
−
4
c
. (35)
The boundary value T2 can be obtained from T2 = τ
σ
2 + log(x
σ
r2
(c−1)+1)/(c−1).
Now we compute the value functions Ur(T ) and Um(T ) for the region B (T1 <
T ≤ T2), where only the mutant uses bang-bang control. For the resident population
we have
Ur(T ) =Ur2e
−c(T−τ2), Ur2 = xr2(1− xr2)+
1−2xr2
c
, (36)
where the point with coordinates (xr2 ,xr2 ,τ2) defines the intersection of the trajec-
tory and surface Sσr :
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τ2 =− logxr2 +
2
xr2c
−
4
c
, xr2 =
e(c−1)(T−τ2)−1
c−1
. (37)
For the mutant population the value functionUm in the region with u = uˆ and um = 1
satisfies the equation resulting from (33):
U
(uˆ,1)
m = x
2
m1
(xr/xr1)
2 , (38)
where (xr1 ,xm1 ,τ1) is the point of intersection of the trajectory with the curve AB
(see Fig. 6). Using (38) and notation from (37), we can writeUm(T )=Um2e
−c(T−τ2),
Um2 = x
2
m1
(xr2/xr1)
2
, which is analogous to (36).
In the region C the value function for the resident has the same form as in (36),
but it has a different form for the mutant. Suppose that the optimal trajectory inter-
sects the surface Sσ at the point with coordinates (x˜r2 , x˜m2 , τ˜2). Then the Bellman
function at this point is given by
U˜m2 = x˜
2
r2
(
c2
16
−
4+3x˜r2c
24x˜3r2c
)
+
3x˜r2c(2x˜r2c+3)+4
24x˜r2c
,
which is written using (34) with definition of the constantC3 from the given bound-
ary conditions.
When the optimal trajectory moving along the surface Sσ intersects the curve AD
at some point with coordinates (x˜σr2 , x˜
σ
m2
, τ˜σ2 ) (see Fig. 6), the Bellman function can
be expressed as follows: U˜σm2 = U˜m2 x˜
σ
r2
/x˜r2 . Thus Um(T ) = U˜
σ
m2
e−c(T−τ
σ
2 ).
The difference in the values functions (number of offspring per mature individ-
ual) of the mutant and optimally behaving resident is presented in Fig. 8. It is shown
that as soon as the season length is longer than T1, residents may be out-competed
by selfish ”free riding” mutants (see also Fig. 7). Let us notice, that otherwise the
payoff functions of the mutants and residents are the same. Therefore the optimal
strategy for the resident population is evolutionary stable.
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3.5 Generalization to sufficiently small but non-zero values of ε
In this section we consider the case of non-zero ε such that the condition (24) re-
mains fulfilled. This means that the trajectory intersecting the singular surface Sσr
does not cross it, but moves along it due to the residents who make it invariant
through the behavior uˆr (23).
In this case, the phase space can also be divided into two regions: according to
whether xr is smaller or larger than on S
σ
r . In both of these regions the structure of
the solution has similar properties to the case considered above when ε is arbitrarily
small. On the surface Sσr the optimal behavior is also similar to that of the previous
case.
In the region with larger xr values than the ones on the surface S
σ
r , there is a
part of the switching surface Sm and a singular arc S
σ
1 where the mutant uses an
intermediate strategy. The surface Sσ1 can be defined using the expression (22). In
the other region, we also have a part of Sm and a singular arc S
σ
2 which is different
from Sσ1 and may not exist for some values of the parameters c and ε .
To identify the values for which the surface Sσ2 is a part of the solution let us, write
the necessary conditions as in (31-32): H
∣∣
ur=1
= 0, Am = 0, A
′
m = {AmH } = 0.
Using these equations, we are able to obtain the values of λr, λm and ν on the surface
Sσ2 and substitute them into the second derivativeA
′′
m = {{AmH }H }= 0 to derive
the expression for the singular control applied by the mutant on this surface:
um =
2xm− (1− ε)c(1+ xm)
2− (1− ε)c+ xmεc
. (39)
There are several conditions which must be satisfied. First of all, the control (39)
should be between zero and one
0≤
2xm− (1− ε)c(1+ xm)
2− (1− ε)c+ xmεc
≤ 1 . (40)
Second, the Kelley condition should also be fulfilled [11, p. 200]:
∂
∂um
d2
dt2
∂H
∂um
= {Am{AmH }} ≤ 0 .
This leads to the inequality
2− (1− ε)+ xmεc ≥ 0 . (41)
In particular, conditions (40) and (41) together give xm ≤ 2/(2− c).
To construct the singular arc Sσ2 , we should substitute the singular control um
from (40) and ur = 1 into the equation describing the dynamics (13): x
′
m = xm(1−
c((1−ε)ur +εum))−um, with the boundary conditions obtained from the tangency
condition for the optimal trajectory from the domain um = ur = 1 intersecting the
switching surface Sm:
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xm
(
− log
(
1−
1
2− c(1− ε)
))
=
1
2− c(1− ε)
.
Such tangency occurs only if 0 ≤ 1
2−c(1−ε) ≤ 1, which that comes from the condi-
tion that a singular surface Sm exists only for 0 ≤ xm < 1. This gives the following
inequality: 1− c(1− ε)≥ 0 for the existence of the surface Sσ2 . One can check that
the inequalities (40-41) are fulfilled as well. The optimal behavioral pattern for a
particular case is shown in Fig. 9.
4 Long-term evolution of the system
Model (2) was introduced in [1] as the intra-seasonal part of a more complex multi-
seasonal model of population dynamics in which consumers and resources live for
one season only. It was assumed that the (immature) offspring produced by the
consumers and resources in season i and defined by the system of equations (3),
mature during the inter-season to form the initial consumer and resource popu-
lations of season (i+ 1), up to some overwintering mortality. The consumer and
resource population densities at the beginning of season i+ 1 is thus ci+1 = µcJi,
ni+1(t = 0) = µnJn,i, with Ji and Jn,i defined in (3) (µn,µc < 1 allow for overwinter-
ing mortality).
In the presence of a mutant invasion, things differ slightly as the total consumer
population is structured into cri = (1− εi)ci residents and cmi = εici mutants that
have different reproduction strategies. Assuming that reproduction is asexual and
an offspring simply inherits the strategy of their parent, the inter-seasonal dynamics
are as follows: cri+1 =αU˜r(ci,εi,ni,T ) = (1−εi+1)ci+1, cmi+1 =αU˜m(ci,εi,ni,T ) =
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εi+1ci+1 and ni+1 = βV˜ (ci,εi,ni,T ), where α = µcθ , β = µnγ , and the functions
U˜r =(1−εi)ci
∫ T
0 (1−ur(t))pr(t)dt, U˜m = εici
∫ T
0 (1−um(t))pm(t)dt, V˜ =
∫ T
0 n(t)dt
can be computed from the solution of the optimal control problem (10) with the dy-
namics given by (9). As stated earlier, the energies of both the mutants and residents
are zero at the beginning of each season (pr(0) = pm(0) = 0). For the particular case
ε = 0, the values U˜r and U˜m were derived analytically in subsection 3.4, but these
are not useful in a multi-season study where the frequency of mutants is bound to
evolve. In the following, we therefore resorted to a numerical investigation, in order
to decipher the long-term fate of the mutants’ invasion.
Here, we follow an adaptive dynamics type approach and assume that, among
all possible behaviors [1], the resident consumer and the resource population are
at a (globally stable) equilibrium. We investigate what happens when a small frac-
tion of mutants appear in the resident consumer population. We actually assume
that resident consumers are “naive” in the sense that even if the mutant population
becomes large through the season-to-season reproduction process, the resident con-
sumers keep their collective optimal strategy and treat mutants as cooperators, even
if they do not cooperate.
The case that we investigated is characterized by α = 2, β = 0.5 and T = 4.
Initially, the system is near the all-residents long-term stable equilibrium point c =
0.9055 and n = 1.0848. At the beginning of some season, a mutant population of
small size cm = 0.001 then appears (ε ≈ 1.1 10
−3 < 1/c). We see in Fig. 10 that
the mutant population increases its frequency within the consumer population and
modifies the dynamics of the system. Despite this drastic increase, it is however
noteworthy to underline that ci < 1 in all seasons, so that ε < 1/ci is true verified
and the analysis presented in this paper is valid for all seasons.
The naive behavior of the consumers is detrimental to their progeny: as the sea-
sons pass, mutant consumers progressively take the place of the collectively optimal
residents and even replace them in the long run (Fig. 10), making the mutation suc-
Join forces or cheat: evolutionary analysis of a consumer-resource system 21
cessful. We should however point out that the mutants’ strategy, as described in (10),
is also a kind of “collective” optimum: in some sense, it is assumed that mutants co-
operate with other mutants. If the course of evolution drives the resident population
to 0 and only mutants survive in the long run, this means that the former mutants be-
come the new residents, with exactly the same strategy as the one of the former resi-
dents they replaced. Hence, they are also prone to being invaded by non-cooperating
mutants. The evolutionary dynamics of this naive resident-selfish mutant-resource
thus appears to be a never-ending process: selfish mutants can invade and replace
collectively optimal consumers, but at the end transform into collectively optimal
consumers as well, and a new selfish mutant invasion can start again. We are actu-
ally not in a “Red Queen Dynamics” context, since we focused on the evolution of
one species only, and not co-evolution [18]. Yet, what the Red Queen said to Alice
seems to fit the situation we have just described very well: “here, you see, it takes
all the running you can do to keep in the same place” [5].
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